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Abstract Comparative research on inter-municipal cooperation in eight European
countries shows that there is a great variety of institutional arrangements for cooperation
across the different countries. Also, these arrangements tend to change over time in
terms of the scope of cooperation among partners, their composition and the degree of
organizational integration. This article describes and analyzes the variety of and shifts in
institutional arrangements for a specific class of inter-municipal cooperation arrange-
ments: those that are set up to provide for the joint delivery of public services. It is
argued that specific arrangements are typically the outcomes of interaction between
national institutional contexts,environmental factors and local preferences.
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Introduction
Since the 1950s, local governments in developed countries have played a prominent
part in the provision of public welfare services. Over the past decades, local
governments have faced pressures to produce higher value public services at lower
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costs. Especially the smaller communities have experienced their territorial scale as no
longer compatible with the increasing scale of production required to efficiently
provide for high standard public services. Overall, three strategies are in use to cope
with the problem of scale. The first is territorial reorganization that results in large-
scale local government, a strategy that was followed in some countries (i.e. Sweden,
United Kingdom, Australia), but that has met with steep resistance in many others
because of the value attached to citizen participation and the self government of small
communities. The second strategy is the outsourcing of service delivery to large-scale
private (or public) companies; this strategy was traditionally in use for the provision of
capital intensive services (electricity, waste management), but has spread to a large
variety of public welfare services, due to the rise of neo-liberal ideologies and the New
Public Management Movement (OECD 2002). This article focuses on the third
strategy: inter-governmental or, more specifically, inter-municipal cooperation.
The joint provision of public services by local governments creates economies of
scale and scope and thus offers possibilities to overcome scale-related production
obstacles, to meet the rising expectations of citizens and to achieve cost-efficiencies
(Bish and Ostrom 1973; Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong 1988; Morgan and
Hirlinger 1991; Herweijer 1998: 150; Hulst 2000: 2–4; Airaksinen and Haveri 2003:
9; Hepburn et al. 2004: 14–16; Shresta 2008: 1–9). Nowadays, inter-municipal
cooperation with respect to the provision of public services is a widespread
phenomenon throughout the Western world (Stoner 1964; ACIR 1985; Dafflon and
Perritaz 2000; CDLR 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Warner 2006).1 Waste
disposal, water provision, social (security) services, fire brigades and emergency
services, public transport, environmental protection, public health and education
constitute the policy sectors where local governments frequently cooperate. In spite of
being relatively widespread, inter-municipal cooperation has hardly been subject to
international comparative research. This article reports on research that took to analyse
the background, characteristics and performance of institutional arrangements in a
number of countries, viz. Belgium (Flanders), Germany, Italy, Finland, France, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007).
With respect to inter-municipal cooperation on service delivery three findings are
notable. First, there is considerable variety in institutional arrangements. Arrangements
differ with respect to their composition (only local governments or a mix of
municipalities and other public and/or private partners), their scope (the cooperation
includes one service or a range of services) and the degree of organizational integration
(the service is carried out by a separate joint organization or it is organized through
agreements). Second, there are considerable differences between the countries included
in the research with respect to the dominant forms of cooperation. Third, the picture is
not stable. Over the past decades shifts have occurred on the scope, the composition and
the degree of organizational integration of arrangements for cooperation. This article sets
out to identify the factors that determine the institutional design of cooperation and thus
understand how these shifts can be explained.We start with a brief outline of the concept
of inter-municipal cooperation and the theoretical framework used in the research. For a
more extensive discussion we refer to Hulst and Van Montfort (2007a: 12–16).
1 Local governments also cooperate with respect to planning and policy activities (spatial planning, social
and economic development). Here we will focus on the joint provision of public services.
264 R. Hulst et al.
Theoretical framework
As a preliminary note, the concept of inter-municipal cooperation is used in a broad
sense and includes all arrangements where local governments cooperate with each
other, with other public authorities or with private institutions. For the sake of
simplicity we will frequently just refer to cooperation between municipalities. With
respect to the concept of cooperation, two features are basic. The first is that the
interactions between the cooperating partners concern a common task or goal and
enjoy some degree of institutionalisation. Although in many situations occasional
cooperation between public entities occurs, our analysis is limited to cooperation that
shows more or less stable patterns over time and concerns certain standing issues,
tasks, services or policies.
The second feature concerns the relation between the institutions of cooperation
and the constituting municipalities and other participants. We reserve the concept of
inter-municipal cooperation for institutional arrangements that formally depend on
local government (and other participants) for their establishment, decision-making
and continued existence. Therefore, we exclude authorities, foundations or
companies that have a statutory independence and mandate, even if local
government is somehow involved as a cofounder, shareholder or member of a
supervising board or council.
Our theoretical framework is built on basic concepts of sociological and historical
institutionalism. Central to our approach is the notion that behaviour and decisions
result from the interaction between institutions and actor rationality. In the context of
inter-municipal cooperation we assume public and private actors to be goal-oriented
and rational, albeit in a bounded way, pursuing their interests and making use of
their powers to achieve their goals. But at the same time, we assume that institutions
provide meaning and influence the way actors define their interests and preferences
(cf. Berger and Luckmann 1966; March and Olsen 1987; DiMaggio and Powell
1991; Hall and Taylor 1996). Moreover, we assume that the institutional context
determines the opportunities and constraints actors face and sets the rules of the
game for actors pursuing their goals. While existing institutions thus shape the
strategies and conduct of actors, these in return can crystallize out in new institutions
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 10; Scharpf 1997: 38; Scharpf 2007). We thereby assume
that path dependency plays a role: strategic choices made at one point in history
constrain the range of possibilities for later strategic choices as much as existing
institutions leave their tracks in new institutions (North 1991; Tilly 1994; Hay and
Wincott 1998).2
2 Our institutional framework contrasts with the theoretical approach of a number of students of inter-local
cooperation in the United States. There, important work has been done to explain under what conditions
inter-local cooperation occurs, with concepts and models taken from collective action theory, transaction
cost theory and social network theory (cf. Carr and Feiock 2004; Andrew 2005, 2006; Shresta 2008;
Thurmaier and Wood 2002; Wood 2006, 2008). Apart from epistemological preferences, the characteristics
of the object of research may explain the difference in theoretical orientation. Our impression is that in
most European countries central government tends to create detailed legal and financial frameworks and to
interfere actively in inter-local cooperation, much more than in the United States. In the latter setting,
theories focussing on economic rationality and the dynamics of social interaction may have more
explanatory power than in the former.
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This theoretical approach implies that the national institutional context is an
important factor in the explanation of the preference structures of the actors involved
and of the presence and characteristics of cooperative arrangements. We distinguish
three different elements of the institutional context: the formal structure of the state,
the administrative culture, and legislation and incentive structures that specifically
relate to inter-municipal cooperation. The first element, the formal structure of the
state, generally laid down in a country’s constitution and in organic legislation,
includes the number of administrative tiers, the distribution of responsibilities
between the different tiers, the scope and autonomy of local government and the
number and size of the municipalities (Agranoff and McGuire 2004: 496–501;
UNDP 2006: 17–21). These features to a great extent determine the need for and
possible advantages of cooperation.
The second element, the administrative culture comprises sets of values, norms,
informal rules and traditions relating to the state, its political organization and its
public administration. It is generally assumed that these normative elements are not
only reflected in the formal state structure, but also affect the relations and
interactions between the public and private sector and between public authorities
themselves (cf. Loughlin and Peters 1997; Hulst 2000: 34–35; Loughlin 2001;
Visser 2002). While there is ample evidence for the presence of different, long-
lasting state traditions, we should also bear in mind that states have not been immune
to global trends that emerged over the past decades. Western and Northern European
countries have, albeit in different degrees, embraced the ideas of New Public
Management (Hood 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) and of governance through
public-private networks (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; Agranoff 1998), representing
values and policy styles that are at odds with at least some of the existing state
traditions. We assume that the dominant administrative culture will bear upon the
preference for strategies to cope with the need for large-scale service delivery, e.g.
outsourcing to the private sector or inter-municipal cooperation.
The third and last element of the national institutional context we assume relevant is the
way upper level government— central or regional government— approaches the issue of
cooperation. In most countries included in our research legal frameworks to regulate
cooperation are present and in a number of countries central governments use financial
incentives to promote (certain forms of) inter-municipal cooperation. Legislation and
incentives define opportunities and constraints for cooperation and make some
institutional arrangements more attractive than others, sometimes banning others (Parrado
Díez 2006b: 8–13; UNDP 2006: 26–27, 29–32; Osterrieder et al. 2006: 31–32).
We further assume that the preferences of local government and the presence and
characteristics of cooperative arrangements are not only influenced by the national
institutional context but also by ‘environmental factors’ (Morgan and Hirlinger
1991; Carr and LeRoux 2005: 18; UNDP 2006: 8). Social-economic, technological
and demographic circumstances can bear on the need for cooperation: rising scales
of production, urbanization and increasing market pressures may force local
governments to extend the domain of cooperation to new services. Environmental
factors may also influence the preference for certain cooperative arrangements.
When budget cuts are imminent local governments’ priority may be to seek forms of
cooperation that ensure a low cost provision of services. Highly dynamic environ-
ments can induce municipalities to opt for the more flexible forms of cooperation.
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Our central assumption is that the combination of the goals and preferences of
local government, the national institutional context and external factors determines
whether local governments use inter-municipal cooperation as a strategy to cope
with the issues of scale, and if so, what types of institutional arrangements emerge.
In the same way, we assume that shifts in the institutional arrangements for
cooperation are somehow related to changes in the institutional context, external
factors and preference structures of local government.
In the next sections we will successively discuss the three dimensions of
institutional design of inter-municipal service delivery mentioned above and try to
explain the shifts we have observed along these dimensions: the scope of
cooperation, the composition of cooperative arrangements and the degree of
integration.
Scope of cooperation: from single-purpose to multi-purpose organizations and
vice versa
The scope concerns the range of tasks and activities included in the cooperative
arrangement. We distinguish between single-purpose and multi-purpose arrange-
ments (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007c: 216). A clear example of single-purpose
arrangements is formed by joint authorities in their own right that engage in social
services, refuse collection or music education. Multi-purpose authorities or arrange-
ments, on the other hand, integrate a number of tasks or activities, up to the point
where joint authorities assume the form of a quasi-regional government responsible
for a wide range of public services and planning activities.
Shifts go both ways
Taking stock of the scope of the inter-municipal service organizations in the
countries included in our research, we can make two observations. The first is that in
different countries different patterns have developed: in Flanders, Finland and
Germany single-purpose organizations dominate the picture, in Italy organizations
are for the major part multi-purpose, and in France, Spain and the Netherlands
substantial numbers of both types are present.3 The second observation is that in a
number of countries there are considerable shifts in preference for the two types of
organizations. Moreover, these shifts are not unidirectional.
Our research shows that in some of the countries where single purpose
organizations dominated the picture over a length of time, after some point multi-
purpose organizations became more and more popular. In France, single-purpose
entities traditionally dominated the picture, but over the last decade, there is a
substantial growth of multi-purpose organizations. Between 1995 and 2006 the
single-purpose SIVU saw their number decrease from 14,490 to 11,739; in the same
period more than 1500 new multi-purpose organizations—Communautés de
3 For an overall picture of the presence of single and multi-purpose cooperative arrangements in the eight
countries under investigation, see Hulst and Van Montfort (2007c, 216–218).
Institutional Shifts In Inter-Municipal Service Delivery 267
communes, Communautés urbaines and Communautés d’agglomeration—were set
up.4 Also in Finland the traditional way to organize inter-municipal cooperation was
to establish single purpose joint authorities (Kuntayhtymä) that took care of specific
services on behalf of the municipalities, especially in the fields of health care, care of
the disabled and education. Over the past decade however, new joint authorities have
been set up with a multi-purpose character. Between 1997 and 2004, 62 multi-
purpose inter-municipal arrangements for sub-regional development emerged; they
nowadays cover the bigger part of the country. More than 25% have a formal status
and actually provide services themselves. A radical new multi-purpose (pilot) model
is found in the Kainuu-region, where nine municipalities formed a joint authority
responsible for a series of services (education, health care services, welfare for drug
abusers, environmental health care, child welfare) and for economic planning and
development (Haveri and Airaksinen 2007: 51 et passim). In the Netherlands,
between 1985 and 1990, the number of single-purpose arrangements dropped from
1,500 to 659; the bulk of the other arrangements were integrated in 95 multi-purpose
joint authorities (Pröpper et al. 2005: 23–24).
The opposite shift, from multi-purpose to single purpose organizations, can be
observed in Spain. After the introduction of the 1978 Constitution there was a sharp
rise in the establishment of cooperative arrangements and multi-purpose organiza-
tions dominated the picture. In 1998 there were 882 mancomunidades, most of them
multi-purpose in character and 428 consorcios, for the larger part single-purpose.
Around 1990 the tables turned and more and more single purpose organizations were
established. In 2007 the number of consorcios had spectacularly risen to 1014, while
the number of mancomunidades had grown at a much slower rate and did not reach a
1000.5 The case of Netherlands presents a second example. While 95 multi-purpose
organizations were created between 1985 and 1990, in 2005 more than half of them
had been dissolved; the number of single-purpose organizations kept stable (Pröpper
et al. 2005: 23–24).
Institutional context: legal stipulations and incentives
If the formal structure of the state and other elements of the institutional context
induce local governments to cooperate for the delivery of public services, what
determines whether they set up single-purpose or multi-purpose organizations or
arrangements? For an explanation we turn to the opportunities and constraints
created by the legal frameworks and incentive structures directly related to inter-
municipal cooperation. It is possible to distinguish between three different situations:
one in which legislation and policies of upper level government aim to prevent the
establishment of multi-purpose organizations, explicitly forbidding them, prescribing
single-purpose arrangements or somehow creating incentives for the latter; one in
which upper-level government does exactly the opposite, imposing constraints on
single-purpose service organizations; and one in which upper-level government
leaves it to the municipalities themselves to choose the form they prefer.
4 Source: Direction general de collectivités locales: les collectivités locales en chiffres, 2008.
5 Source: Ministerio de hacienda, http://serviciosweb.minhac.es/apps/ispl/aspx/comh300.html
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Belgium (Flanders) and the Netherlands present examples of the first situation.
Both countries have at one time in history issued legislation containing restrictions
on multi-purpose service organizations. The Dutch 1950 Provisions Act stipulated
that every service, task or joint interest municipalities wanted to cooperate on,
required a separate arrangement or organization. The main reason for this absolute
ban on multi-purpose arrangements was to prevent the proliferation of autonomous,
multi-purpose regional authorities. There was a general fear that such authorities
would develop into a new administrative level and hollow out local autonomy (Hulst
2000: 7). In Flanders, the 2001 Framework Decree on Inter-Municipal Cooperation
introduced four new administrative forms to replace the existing intercommunales.
While the intercommunales could have multiple objectives, the service association
must limit its activities to one well-determined service, the mandated association to
one or more clearly stated tasks in one or in functionally related policy areas and the
inter-local and project associations to a project of limited scope. The restrictions on
the scope of inter-municipal cooperation are meant to restore the democratic
supervision by the local councils (De Peuter and Wayenberg 2007: 27–28). The
dominant position of single-purpose organizations in the Netherlands between 1950
and 1985 and the shift from multi-purpose to single purpose organizations in
Flanders over the past years are clearly related to the legal constraints concerning
inter-municipal cooperation.
The second situation was found in France (after 1992) and in the Netherlands
(after 1985). Both countries introduced legislation to promote the establishment of
multi-purpose joint authorities, preferably integrating all services and tasks in a rural
region or urban agglomeration. Prior to these interventions, in both countries a large
number of single-purpose organizations had developed over time, which organized
different groups of municipalities that varied from service to service. It had resulted
in fragmented and obscure administrative systems that lacked built in mechanisms
for integrated policy-making and coordinated service delivery (Hulst 2000: 10–11;
Hulst 2005: 107–108; West 2007: 72–74). The Dutch strategy was primarily one of
coercion. The 1985 Joint Provisions Act simply ordered provinces to divide their
territory into functionally coherent regions and obliged municipalities to integrate
their cooperative arrangements into one multi-purpose joint authority (Hulst 2000:
12–14). The French followed a piece-meal approach using a mix of instruments.
From 1992 on, through subsequent legislation, a series of new administrative forms
were introduced for the urban areas, with different sets of compulsory functions and
their own financial resources (West 2007: 78–81). Moreover, central government
introduced the concepts of aire urbaine and agglomeration (for the urban areas) and
pays (for the rural areas), referring to functionally coherent territories, and has been
pushing local government to organize their cooperation on that basis (West 2007:
88). Amongst other things, it introduced criteria and procedures for the identification
of functionally coherent territories and set out to close contracts with the
administrative boards of the pays, entailing financial resources for social and
economic development (Hulst 2005: 108).
While the main purpose of the Dutch project was to rationalize inter-municipal
cooperation and improve transparency for the sake of democratic accountability, in
France the promotion of multi-purpose authorities for service delivery (and
planning) seems to serve as a means to create a fourth national territorial institution
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alongside the region, the departement and the municipality (West 2007: 89).
Whatever the central government motives in play, the legal frameworks and national
policies that were introduced in the Netherlands and France in 1985 and 1992
respectively, can explain the shift from single purpose to multi-purpose cooperative
arrangements.
If the third situation occurs, one in which upper-level government leaves it to the
municipalities themselves to choose the institutional design for cooperation, the
preference structure of local government is likely to be the determinant factor, a
factor that we will address now.
Local preferences
To gain insight in the role of local preference structures for the institutional design of
cooperation, we must dwell upon some of the features of the different forms of
cooperation.
Cooperation opens the way to higher quality services at lower costs, but
cooperation itself also brings along extra costs compared to service delivery by
individual local governments. In most of the countries included in our sample the
establishment of a joint organization requires drawing up statutes that contain
provisions concerning its aim, the decision-making authority attributed by the
municipalities, the governing bodies, the funding of the organization, the
modification of the statutes and the dissolution of the organization, amongst others.
In some countries the establishment of the organizations and their statutes are subject
to approval of upper level government. In Flanders, for example, the establishment
of a joint service organization (dienstverlenende vereniging), one of the heavier
forms of cooperation, is surrounded with extensive safeguards and requires the
drawing up and approval of a series of documents (De Peuter and Wayenberg 2007:
25–26). Apart from the start up costs, there are also costs related to the government
and management of the organization. The joint character of the organization
generally implies the presence of general boards composed of delegates from the
local councils and executive boards with three or more members. Moreover,
decision-making at the supra-municipal level involves periodic consultation of and
reporting to the local councils, activities that require administrative support at the
inter-municipal level.
Assuming that local governments seek cost efficient service delivery—this will be
the case especially when local resources are scarce—start up and management costs
constitute drivers for the establishment of multi-purpose service organizations,
because it enables them to share management costs for different services. Moreover,
once a joint authority is established, it is easier to transfer new services to an existing
organization than to set up a new single-purpose organization. The Spanish case
provides a good example. After the transition to a democratic regime, land marked
by the 1978 Constitution, for the major part microscopic local government with few
technical and economic resources was not only granted formal autonomy for the first
time in history, legislation also stipulated a series of basic public services to be
rendered. The vast majority of the 8,100 municipios—7,000 of which have a
population fewer than 5,000—was not in a position to render these services on a
stand-alone basis. Consequently, the number of mancomunidades, public bodies set
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up and governed by groups of neighbouring municipalities, rose sharply. The major part
of the now 998 mancomunidades6 is multi-purpose and there are many that cover all
the services and tasks that local governments in a certain area cooperate on, thus
profiting from a common administrative infrastructure (Nieto Garrido 2007: 178).
While considerations of cost-efficiency are a driver to set up multi-purpose
organizations or to integrate new services into existing organizations, our research
shows that once these organizations are in full operation, issues of manageability and
control arise. In the first place, the more services are integrated into one
organization, the more difficult it is to manage the organization as a whole, to
coordinate and create synergy between the different services and to manage the
separate services adroitly. In the second place, big multi-purpose organizations
sometimes prove to be a threat to the very municipalities that established them.
Spain and the Netherlands present examples of countries where considerations of
manageability and control have led to a shift from multi-purpose to single purpose
organizations.
The Spanish consorcios constitute an administrative form especially designed to
institutionalize vertical intergovernmental relations (Nieto Garrido 2007: 182).
However, there are an increasing number of single-purpose consorcios that are
purely inter-municipal; in 1998 they made up about 8% of a total of 428, in 2006
purely inter-municipal consorcios amounted to more than 10% of a total of 1014.
There are strong indications that the complicated governance structures of the multi-
purpose mancomunidades hinder the effective management of the organizations and
that local governments seek the simpler, professional management structures of the
smaller and more transparent single-purpose consorcios (Font and Parrado Díez
2001). In the Netherlands there are examples of municipalities dismantling multi-
purpose organizations in order to improve the management of services and to regain
local control over inter-municipal authorities that in their view had gotten out of
hand.7 In the province of Noord-Brabant, the participating municipalities abolished
four out of six multi-purpose joint authorities that organized cooperation on a
number of public services (health care, emergency services) and planning tasks
(public housing, spatial planning). Subsequently, services were organized in single-
purpose organizations or in multi-purpose entities integrating only closely inter-
related services.
When choosing between single and multi-purpose organizations, apart from
considerations of start up costs, management costs and control, there is also the issue
of scale. Every service has an optimum scale of operation, i.e. a scale on which the
service can be rendered in the required variety and quality at the lowest production
costs (cf. Ostrom 1976). If a service requires a variety of specialized personnel and
capital goods, the minimum scale of operation will be relatively big. On the other
hand, some services also have a maximum scale of operation given the character-
istics and availability of the production goods involved. Fire stations must be able to
6 Statistics from the Spanish Department of Public Administration, 2006. Available at: http://www.dgal.
map.es/cgi-bin/webapb/webdriver?MIval=REEL_manc_num
7 A local executive of one of the municipalities involved in the dismantling of the multi-purpose authority
in the Breda agglomeration formulated the problems in a nutshell: it had become an authority that had a
huge staff, cost lots of money, was hardly manageable anymore, lacked efficiency and on which local
government had no influence (cited in Notermans 2007: 40).
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reach seats of fire within a certain time limit and can thus only service a limited
territory. The integration of different services into one multi-purpose organization
generally implies that all services are delivered to the same group of municipalities,
and therefore on the same territorial scale. For some of the services the multipurpose
organization will be under or over-bounded (cf. Bennett 1993: 7–8). Put in another
way, if an optimal scale of public service production is a dominant consideration for
the partners involved, they will tend to set up different single-purpose organizations,
so that each service can be delivered at its own optimal scale.
France and the Netherlands present good examples of the relevance of scale
considerations on the institutional design of cooperation. In both countries cooperation
between municipalities has a long history and has gradually intensified over time. In
France local government was free to opt for single-purpose (SIVU) or multi-purpose
organizations (SIVOM); single-purpose organizations for a long time dominated the
picture. The same communes generally participate in a number of single-purpose
organizations at the time, which frequently organize different groups of communes
and thus operate on different territorial scales (Hulst 2005). In the Netherlands the
1500 single-purpose arrangements that were created between 1950 and 1985 covered
more than 30 different services and showed substantial variation in composition and
scale (Hulst 2000: 10). The logic of the appropriate scale came fully to the fore when
central government tried to rationalize inter-municipal cooperation and issued the
1985 Joint Provisions Act prescribing that all cooperation should take place in one
multi-purpose public body organizing the same group of municipalities and operate
on the same scale. Local government vehemently protested and successfully lobbied
for escape clauses allowing them to engage in cooperative arrangements on a smaller
or bigger scale, if the service in question so required. In 1990, despite the legal
stipulations aimed at the establishment of multi-purpose organizations, 754 single-
purpose cooperative arrangements still remained (SGBO 1991). Even so, over the
past decades Dutch local government has not stopped to lobby for the elimination of
all restrictions concerning single-purpose organizations. In the end it was successful:
in a 2006 revision of the Joint Provisions Act the restrictions were lifted.
Composition of arrangements: from horizontal to vertical forms of cooperation
The composition of cooperative arrangement refers to the participating actors.
Cooperation can be restricted to municipalities, but local governments can also
extend their cooperative arrangements to include other public authorities (upper level
government, specialised government agencies) or private sector organizations
(foundations and companies) (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007c: 212). We limit our
discussion to the shift between horizontal arrangements that organize cooperation
between municipalities and vertical arrangements that integrate municipalities and
upper level government.
Two types of vertical arrangements
In almost all countries included in the research there is a strong presence of
cooperative arrangements that involve only municipalities (Hulst and Van Montfort
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2007c: 213). However, in a number of countries institutionalised cooperation
between local government and upper level government institutions is gaining
popularity. This is the case in Spain, France and the United Kingdom. We can
distinguish between two types of vertical arrangements. The first concerns standing
organizations set up to provide for the actual delivery of public services, where local
governments cooperate with each other and with upper level local or regional
government. The second concerns contract like arrangements, which primarily aim
to improve service delivery at the local level through coordination and performance
management. Vertical contracts are generally closed between local government(s) on
the one hand and central and/or regional government on the other.
The Spanish consorcios and the French syndicats mixtes are examples of the first
type. Syndicats mixtes are standing organizations with a board and staff of their
own. Their number has risen substantially over the last decade, from 1107 in 1995 to
2749 at the end of 2006.8 There is a wide variety of syndicats mixtes, some
including the departement and a number of multi-purpose and single-purpose inter-
municipal organizations, some also including the regional government in place.
They cover a wide range of services, from public utilities such as electricity, water
provision and public transport to education and tourism. The number of Spanish
consorcios rose from 428 in 1998 to a total of 1014 in 2006.9 As mentioned in the
previous section, the share of purely inter-municipal consorcios has risen, but the
vast majority of conosorcios still organizes cooperation between different levels of
government, and is thus vertical in character. In Spain, the cooperation between local
governments and the provinces is the most popular of all possible vertical
combinations. They cover more than 30 different services (Font et al. 1999:12;
Parrado Díez 2006a: 7).
The second type of vertical arrangements concerns contractual agreements. They
include the Contrats de ville, Contrats d’agglomeration and Contrats de pays in
France and the Local Public Service Agreements in the United Kingdom. Contrats
de ville offer additional financing or influence over central policy-making in return
for greater coherence in local actions (Hall and Mawson 1997; Sullivan 2004: 10;
Parrado Díaz 2006b: 9). The first generation Contracts de ville (1993–1997) resulted
in a total 214 contracts covering 1.300 neighbourhoods, which dealt with themes
such as housing, transport and employment (DIV 2000: 3–4). The Contrats de ville
have been substituted by a new type of contracts for the period 2007–2009, the
Contracts urbains de cohesion sociale. In June 2007 nearly 490 contracts were
signed covering 2200 neighbourhoods.10 Although legislation allows for Contrats de
ville between the central state and individual cities, more than 70% organize
cooperation with a number of municipalities.11
In the United Kingdom, Public Service Agreements are used across central and
local government as a mechanism to drive up performance and quality of services.
8 Data from: Ministère de l’interieur. Les collectivités locales en chiffres. 2007.
9 Statistics from the Spanish Department of Public Administration, 2006. Available at: http://www.dgal.
map.es/cgi-bin/webapb/webdriver?MIval=REEL_manc_num
10 Data from Ministère de Logement et de la Ville, Delegation interministerièlle à la ville, available at:
http://www.ville.gouv.fr/politique-de-la-ville/cucs.htm
11 Source: Délégation interministérielle à la ville. Le rapport d'information sur l'avenir des contrats de ville
- Sénat rapport n° 402 (2004–2005).
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Local Public Service Agreements (LPSA) were first set up in 2000 and were
extended to all upper tier authorities in 2001. The purpose of the agreements is to
support local authorities in tackling underperformance and to help achieve specific
strategic aims over the life of the agreement. Financial rewards, paid directly by the
government, are associated with the achievement of the targets agreed upon (Parrado
Díez 2006b: 9; Kelly 2007: 202–203). Since 2005 the system of LPSAs is
complemented with Local Area Agreements (LAAs). The primary purpose of an
LAA is to simplify funding arrangements from central government to councils.
Furthermore, the program is designed to promote closer cooperation between
providers of public services, with the aim that these arrangements will allow
increased flexibility for local innovations in service delivery to fit local circum-
stances (Kelly 2007: 203–205). From 2001 the Government Offices signed 144
LPSAs with upper tier local authorities. Two rounds of LAAs followed, both rounds
including more than 60 agreements.12 In areas with a two-tiered local government,
all local entities involved are co-signers of the agreement and coordination between
them is thus one of the elements. But more so, the agreements aim at the
coordination of service delivery between individual local governments and other
providers, public and private.
Institutional context: legal stipulations and incentives
The increasing popularity of the first type of vertical arrangements, the service
organizations like the Spanish consorcios and the French syndicats mixtes, cannot be
ascribed to obligations following from new legislation. In both countries legislation
has since long made it possible to set up cooperative arrangements between local
government and upper level government entities. In fact, the syndicats mixtes were
introduced in 1935, and a decree from 195513 explicitly stated that public bodies of
different administrative levels could take part.14 In Spain, the 1955 Reglamento de
Servicios de las Corporaciones Locales laid down rules for the consorcios. Public
bodies such as mancomunidades, provincial authorities and central government
bodies were allowed to participate. Since the 1978 Constitution, the regional
autonomous authorities, the Comunidades Autónomas, can also be partners in a
consorcio (Nieto Garrido 2007: 172). While the legislation in both countries contains
criteria and procedures for the establishment and management of the joint
organizations, it is up to the partners to decide if they want to engage in this type
of cooperation. To some extent, the growth of vertical service organizations has to
do with incentive structures. In Spain there are substantial differences between the
regions with respect to the popularity of consorcios, and the preferences of the
Comunidades Autónomas seem responsible for this, as in some regions funds are
linked to the preferred form of cooperation (Font and Parrado Díez 2001; Nieto
Garrido 2007: 175).
12 Data from http://www.communities.gov.uk
13 Décret n°55-606 du 20 mai 1955.
14 Since 2004 the so-called closed syndicates can only consist of inter-municipal authorities. The open
syndicates may include all types of public bodies.
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With respect to the rising popularity of the second type of vertical arrangements,
the contracts in France and the United Kingdom, the financial incentives created by
the respective central governments seem to be the main explanatory factor. In both
countries, the vertical arrangements came into existence after central government
had introduced a financial support system. In the United Kingdom the LPSAs were
backed up by pump priming grants and performance reward grants (Parrado Díez
2006b: 9). In the period of the first generation LPSAs (2001-early 2004), central
government offered a maximum performance reward grant of 2½% of a year’s net
budget for achieving the negotiated targets in full. A scaled-down grant was given
for achieving a large portion of the expected improvement (Kelly 2007: 203). The
French programs for the different types of contracts imply financial transfers of
many billions of euros from central and regional governments to local government in
the form of credits and tax exemptions.
In both countries the horizontal coordination of service delivery and regeneration
policies is one of the explicit goals of the vertical arrangements. Cooperation
between municipalities and public and semi-public agencies to overcome the
territorial (France) and functional fragmentation (UK) in practice serves as one of the
conditions for closing the contracts (Wassenberg et al. 2006: 19, 39). Local
government and other partners at the local level do not have much choice. They
either commit themselves to cooperate with each other or stand to loose substantial
financial resources.
Local preferences
While the increase in vertical contractual arrangements implying cooperation
between local institutions and upper level governments can be explained by the
financial incentives created by central governments, the growth of the number of
vertical service organizations in Spain and France, the consorcios and the syndicats
mixtes, cannot. There seem to be three reasons for local governments to engage in
vertical service organizations.
A first reason to create joint authorities that integrate public entities on different
administrative levels is the need for vertical coordination between interdependent or
sometimes overlapping jurisdictions of the actors involved. In France, syndicats
mixtes organizing cooperation between inter-municipal authorities, departments and
regions are found in sectors like water management and public transport, policy
domains on which all entities have some competency. In Spain, examples are
consorcios that provide public transport and consorcios that act as chambers of
commerce. In these cases, the consorcios provide the organizational setting for the
execution of joint responsibilities of local governments and provinces.
A second reason relates to the scale of cooperation. This seems to be especially
relevant to explain the growth of certain types of single-purpose syndicats mixtes in
France. In 1999, the Chevènement law introduced a series of new administrative
forms for inter-municipal cooperation, but both the old (SIVU and SIVOM) and new
joint authorities (Communauté urbaine, Communauté d’agglomeration, Commu-
nauté de commune) were often not large enough for the effective delivery of certain
public services. This was particularly the case for waste management (waste-to-
energy plants or recycling centres) and the provision of electricity, which must
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operate on a scale much larger than an agglomeration or a rural inter-municipal
authority (West 2007: 87).
A third reason to create vertical service organizations is to gain access to
resources from upper level government, either financial resources or technical know
how. This factor seems especially relevant for Spain. Spanish legislation stipulates
that the provinces support and cooperate with local government on legal, economic
and technical issues (Nieto Garrido 2007: 170). Therefore it stands to reason that
Spanish local governments seek cooperation with the provinces (frequently) and the
regional government (occasionally) to provide services like specialised fire brigades
(forest areas), water provision, waste management, and cultural and educational
facilities. For small communities scant of resources, upper level government has
more technical know how and financial resources to offer than equally poorly
equipped neighbouring local government.
Organizational integration: from standing organizations to contractual
agreements
The degree of organizational integration refers to the distinction between standing
organizations and lighter forms of cooperation such as agreements. A standing
organization represents the most organizationally integrated form of cooperation. It
implies the integration of activities formerly carried out individually by municipal-
ities into a new organization jointly run by the municipalities and any admissible
participants. Agreements constitute a less integrated form of cooperation. They can
organize service delivery between the partners, for example, by outsourcing the
activities to a participating municipality or private company (Hulst and Van Montfort
2007c: 219).
Towards lighter forms of cooperation
With the exception of the UK, in all countries included in the research, cooperating
municipalities make use of standing organizations for service delivery. It is often the
dominant way to provide basic services like water distribution, waste disposal, fire
brigades, public health or environmental protection. In a number of countries however,
standing organizations are losing their popularity compared to cooperative arrange-
ments that are organizationally less integrated. Less integrated forms include light
associations without a staff of its own and agreements that either regulate service
delivery by one public or private partner to the other partners or that coordinate the
service delivery of different partners. Typical examples of light-touch associations are
the inter-local and project associations in Flanders. After the introduction of these new
administrative forms, within a few years a total of 69 light associations was
established, partly substituting the former heavier intercommunales. They can be
found in a variety of policy sectors (De Peuter and Wayenberg 2007: 26–27).
With respect to service delivery agreements we can distinguish between public-
public and public-private agreements. The first category includes service agree-
ments, where one municipality purchases the service from a neighbour or agrees to
some form of exchange of services between the partners involved. In Finland this
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type of arrangements is becoming more popular and is replacing joint service
delivery through standing organizations (Haveri and Airaksinen 2007: 49–50). In the
Netherlands the so-called ‘centre municipality construction’ is quite frequently used
in the delivery of social security services, the processing of grievances by a local
ombudsman and the granting of environmental licenses (Pröpper et al. 2005: 19;
Hulst and Van Montfort 2007b: 147–150). These arrangements are a specific
manifestation of the present-day concept of ‘inter-governmental shared services’
(Korsten et al. 2004: 57–59).
The second category of agreements includes contracts that regulate the
outsourcing of public services to private companies. Typical examples of inter-
municipal cooperation that in the end leads to outsourcing to private companies we
can find in France. There, new inter-municipal communities set up for public service
delivery, transfer this responsibility to a larger syndicat mixte, which in turn contracts
out the service to a private utility. In this way, it might be said that services are
delivered through a complex nexus of contracts (West 2007: 87).
Institutional context: legislation and administrative culture
In some of the countries included in our sample legislation is or at some time was
restrictive with respect to the institutional form of cooperation, banning certain types
or imposing heavy juridical forms. Restrictions applied in the Netherlands, where the
1950 legislation with respect to cooperation stipulated that cooperative arrangements
under private law could only be used in special cases. Belgium is an example of a
country that imposed a heavy juridical form for inter-municipal cooperation, until
the promulgation of the 2002 decree, which introduced several lighter forms. In
these situations, a shift from heavy to light forms of cooperation can be directly
attributed to the abolishment of restrictions or impositions that local governments
find dysfunctional and to the preference of local government for simple and flexible
institutions for cooperation, which we will discuss in the next section.
In most cases however, national legislation leaves local governments substantial
leeway for the organization of their cooperation. Nowadays, Finnish, French, Dutch,
Belgian and Italian legislation, for example, offers local government a range of
different administrative forms to choose from, and there are no absolute bans on
outsourcing the delivery of public services to the private sector. In the absence of
legal restrictions, the shift to lighter, less bureaucratic forms of cooperation seems to
be related to changes in the administrative culture. Due to increasing pressures on
the performance of the state, because of globalization and European integration, the
major part of Western European countries have to some extent adopted the paradigm
of New Public Management. They introduced elements of marketization and have
moved away from bureaucracy as the prime organizing principle for the public
sector (Hughes 2003: 15). Contracting, both within the public sector and between the
public and the private sector, is pervading modern Western European administrative
organization (Lane 2001).
France, the UK and Finland provide good examples. Although France has a long
history of providing public services via contract, nowadays long-term relationships
between government and private providers are increasingly being substituted by
short term competitive contracting (West 2005). Moreover, inter-governmental
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contracting, between the state, the regions and local government, has gradually
substituted the centralistic planning procedures that were en vogue (and not very
successful) before 1980. In the United Kingdom central government has combined
performance budgeting with contract agreements with local governments (see
section 4.1). Governance through networks and contractual relations has become a
dominant characteristic of British local government (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998).
Also Finland is one of the countries where NPM ideas are put into practice quite
drastically. NPM themes as decentralisation, lightening of bureaucracy, empower-
ment of market mechanisms, decreased regulation and a shift from input budgeting
to a stronger focus on results, have become part and parcel of the administrative
culture (Haveri and Airaksinen 2007: 47–48). They have not only stimulated inter-
municipal cooperation in general, but also seem reflected in the growing preference
for contract like agreements.
Although it would require more detailed research to show that the fashion of New
Public Management actually influences the preferences of local government for
contract like arrangements and joint outsourcing, there seems to be an undeniable
correlation. The countries that are considered forerunners in the modernization of
public administration—the UK, the Scandinavian countries, France, the Netherlands,
among others (Hood 1995)—are also moving to lighter and less integrated forms of
cooperation. In Spain considered to be operating in the rearguard with respect to the
adoption of New Public Management practices (Hood 1995) there is no significant
shift towards the contractualization of inter-municipal (or inter-governmental)
service delivery.
Local preferences
Although the New Public Management reform undeniably has elements of a fashion,
and contractualization is used because it is the ‘modern way’ to govern, it also
addresses some genuine concerns, motives and priorities of local governments. Even
if light forms of cooperation or contracts would not be fashionable, there would be
reasons to prefer it to more bureaucratic forms of cooperation.
In the first place there is the consideration of cost efficiency. Using contractual
agreements, municipalities can avoid the start-up costs and costs related to the
governance and management of a joint organization and still create the same
economies of scale. As mentioned earlier, formal procedures for the establishment of
joint organizations, joint management, and provisions for control and accountability
of local councils involve additional costs. Moreover the establishment of a new
organization for service delivery requires building up knowledge, skills and
organizational routines. If small communities contract out service delivery to one
of the municipalities in their region, they can profit from the experience and
specialist knowledge built up by service delivery agencies of their big neighbour.
Cost-efficiency also plays a role in inter-municipal cooperation that results in the
outsourcing of public services to private firms. Local governments can evidently
hope to get a better deal from private companies if they join forces and strengthen
their bargaining power vis-à-vis the private sector and if they purchase large
quantities of the services in question. Typically this kind of cooperation for
outsourcing takes place in sectors where large scale-production yields efficiencies,
278 R. Hulst et al.
such as electricity provision; drink water provision and public transport and road
maintenance and repair (Wilson and Game 2006).
A second motive for using contractual arrangements instead of standing
organizations for service delivery is the need for flexibility. Once standing
organizations have been established, it often requires formal decision-making
procedures involving all the partners in cooperation to adapt to new circumstances.
Moreover, diversification, expansion or reduction of the services involved cannot be
accomplished without substantial interventions in the standing organization.
Contractual agreements are, on the other hand, relatively flexible, although they
will generally have a fixed term and cover a number years, especially when the
service rendered requires investments from the part of the producer. But adjustment
is generally a simple matter of agreement between the parties involved. This
flexibility makes them appropriate instruments in the case of new services, tasks or
projects with a temporary character or services that have to be rendered in a dynamic
environment. Typically in Finland the contractual arrangements are in use for
projects and services with a temporary character (Haveri and Airaksinen 2007: 50).
The case of Flanders illustrates the importance local government attributes to
flexible cooperative arrangements. As mentioned earlier, recent legislation intro-
duced administrative forms of cooperation that were lighter than the existing
intercommunales. Local government has eagerly taken up the opportunity to
organize their cooperation in less integrated arrangements. But an evaluation of
the implementation of the new legislation shows that municipalities are not at all
satisfied with the new administrative forms, because they still have to follow all
kinds of rules and regulations for their establishment and modification. They feel
that they can’t tailor cooperation to their specific needs and that they face
considerable costs if they want to expand or intensify cooperation or adapt it to
new circumstances (De Peuter and Wayenberg 2007: 31–32).
Conclusions
Inter-municipal cooperation is a widespread phenomenon throughout the Western
world. Our inventory research of the institutional arrangements for cooperation in
eight European countries not only shows that these arrangements vary with respect
to the scope of cooperation, their composition and organizational integration, but it
also brings to the fore that shifts occur with respect to the dominant type of
institutional arrangements. In this article we have tried to unravel the factors that can
explain the existence of different forms of inter-municipal cooperation and of shifts
between them; shifts between single-purpose and multi-purpose arrangements,
between horizontal and vertical forms of cooperation and between standing
bureaucratic organizations and contractual agreements. But explanations cannot be
reduced to simple factors. It is the interaction between external factors, the
institutional context and the preference structures of local government that in the
end determines the pattern of cooperation and the shifts therein. In the previous
sections we have focussed on the individual factors with occasional attention for
their interaction. In this concluding section we will return to the complex
interrelations between the different factors.
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With respect to the scope of cooperation it seems clear that the national legislation
and incentive structures play a prominent role. If these prescribe or favour one
administrative form—a single-purpose or a multi-purpose arrangement—over the
other, it will have an immediate impact on the patterns of cooperation. On the other
hand, our research shows that if external, e.g. political factors induce local
governments to put high value on cost efficiency or on arrangements that create
the optimal scale of service delivery, they tend to mould legislation to their own
interests or circumvent it. Thus we can explain why in the Netherlands, long after the
Joint Provisions Act of 1985 imposed the use of multi-purpose arrangements, a large
number of single-purpose arrangements survived. Local government used all
available legal loopholes to keep single-purpose arrangements alive because these
enabled them to cooperate with varying groups of municipalities and thus provide
single services on different scales. It also explains why in Flanders we sometimes
find a series of formally single-purpose arrangements, as required by law, which de
facto are one and the same multi-purpose institution with a common staff and board.
This way the local governments reduce management costs and create better
conditions for synergy (De Peuter and Wayenberg 2007: 32.
If national legislation leaves it to the municipalities themselves to organize their
cooperation in single or multi-purpose arrangements, local government will
generally seek arrangements that best meet the actual local preferences. But
elements of the institutional context or environmental factors can alter the preference
structure. Cost-efficiency may become very important for microscopic local
government that is confronted with a sudden expansion of the local service domain
and lead to the predominance of multi-purpose organizations (the Spanish case after
the 1978 Constitution). On the other hand, a change in the political culture
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emphasizing the importance of local control over cooperative arrangements can
eventually lead to the dismantling of multi-purpose organizations, of which some
examples are present in the recent Dutch practice.
With respect to the composition of cooperative arrangements elements of the
formal state structure set the stage. The large scale and the strong financial
dependency of local government in the United Kingdom can explain the near
absence of purely-inter municipal cooperation until now, as well as the fact that
cooperation is predominantly vertical in character. But other elements of the
institutional context, i.e. pressures from central government to improve efficiency,
and external factors such as the growing economies of scale of IT and
communication services, have actually induced local governments to set up inter-
municipal call centres and to collaborate in revenue collection and benefits pay
(Kelly 2007: 208).
In the same way the organizational integration of cooperative arrangements and
the shifts that can be observed therein, are the outcome of a combination of elements
of the institutional context, local preferences and external factors. In most European
countries included in the research, inter-municipal cooperation with respect to
service delivery took the form of standing public organizations governed by the
participating municipalities. A more dynamic environment, a revaluation of the
private sector as a possible producer of public services and more emphasis on value
for money have resulted in a growing popularity of contract like arrangements
between municipalities and in the (joint) outsourcing to the private sector. Then
again, we may not preclude that in some European countries the tables may turn
again, if public accountability and control move up in the preference structure of
local government.
We have summarized the different factors and their interrelationship in Fig. 1. We
think that the case for the power of our model to explain the presence and shifts in
the patterns of inter-municipal cooperation has been sufficiently made. At the same
time we do not pretend to have identified all relevant external factors and elements
of the institutional context or to have unravelled all interrelationships between the
different factors. This will evidently require (a lot) more research.
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